complaints of the opposition, and the KMT and the CCP simply continued the cross-Strait negotiations. The two sides signed agreements on direct postal services, transportation, trade and a diplomatic truce. The rapprochement between the KMT and the CCP culminated in the signing of the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in Chongqing on 29 June 2010, which took place despite the strong public demand for a referendum on the issue. The date and place of the signing of this agreement was a further source of irritation for pro-Taiwan supporters: Hong Kong and China had signed the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement on 29 June 2003, and the Second United Front of 1937 -the alliance between the KMT and the CCP into which Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) had been forced -had been signed in Chongqing.
The outcome of this interaction between Taiwan and mainland China is still difficult to predict. For instance, the increase in the number of PRC tourists visiting Taiwan, rather re-igniting the "Shanghai fever" of the early 1990s among the Taiwanese, seems to have aroused intense feelings of alienation in people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. At the same time, however, Taiwanese popular culture is becoming the vogue in mainland China, where "Taiwan streets" are being built in many cities and China's creative industries have started to see Taiwan as a role model (Lin 2010) . Despite the closer economic and cultural interactions, the CCP government has not toned down its political rhetoric and continues to reiterate claims that Taiwan is merely a province of China.
In addition, although "re-renaming" certain places and institutions has taken place under the new KMT government, the changes have not always been consistent: For example, while Taiwan's postal service was re-named Chunghwa Post, the Chinese Petroleum Corp. is today still the CPC Corp., Taiwan ( , Taiwan Zhong you) . Long Live Chiang Kaishek Road ( , Jieshou lu) in front of the Presidential Palace, which was renamed when Chen Shui-bian (Chen Shuibian) was mayor of Taibei, is still called Ketagalan Boulevard, in honor of the Aborigines who once inhabited the Taibei basin. Taibei's airport, once officially known as Chiang Kai-shek Airport, is still called Taoyuan International Airport. The renaming of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall to Democracy Memorial Hall has always provoked heated controversy: When Chen Shui-bian announced this measure in 2007, the pan-blue media immediately accused him of initiating political moves to liquidate the historical heritage of the Republic of China and of implementing ethnic-cleansing policies. The DPP supporters, at the same time, spoke of transitional justice and celebrated the change of name. However, while the name of this landmark site has since been changed back to the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, the area around it is still called Liberty Square, and the four characters da zhong zhi zheng "Great Mean/ Perfect Uprightness"), which referred indirectly to Chiang Kai-shek, were removed from the entrance gate to the square and have not since been reinstated.
Identity Politics and Taiwanization
The question of identity formation in Taiwan after 2008 is full of contradictions: In the 2008 presidential election, Ma Ying-jeou had to project a "Taiwanized" image of himself which suggested "the strong impact of two decades of Taiwanization policies, focused on the ethnic and cultural realm, [and] on the political market of Taiwan" (Copper 2009: 472 ). Ma's increasing focus on "Greater China" after the election led to declining confidence in his government as has been shown quite clearly in the losses sustained by the KMT in almost all the by-elections since 2008. Although the KMT somehow managed to win mayoral elections in three out of five cities in the December 2010 municipal elections, the total percentage of votes they gained (44.54 per cent) was lower than that of the DPP (49.87 per cent). In his inaugural speech in 2008, Ma Ying-jeou had focused on the promotion of "harmony among sub-ethnic groups", but in 2010, he started to argue that "the people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are ethnic Chinese" and "descendants of the legendary emperors, Yan and Huang" ( , Yan Huang zi sun) (Ma 2010 ). Analogous to this, when talking about the ROC's centennial, Ma's reference to Taiwan's culture as "Chinese culture with Taiwanese characteristics" was vehemently attacked by the DPP: Legislator Chen Ting-fei ( , Chen Tingfei) declared that Taiwanese culture is Taiwanese culture and Chinese culture is Chinese culture. [...] Taiwan has its own culture and it is brand new. There is no such thing as a Greater China culture here (Ko 2010) .
In other areas, however, Ma has demonstrated his commitment to Taiwan's more recent policy of multiculturalism by promoting the Hakka culture and making Hakka the official language in areas where the Hakka are in the majority.
A closer look at the identity shifts and transformations in Taiwan further highlights the complexity of the situation: Frank Muyard, in a recent analysis of Taiwan's identity politics since the election of Ma Ying-jeou, points out that the closer contact between people on both sides has resulted in greater awareness of the differences between the societies: lifestyle, education, behavioural habits, interpersonal relationships, open-mindedness, appreciation of cultures and foreign countries (especially [the] United States and Japan), social security and health systems, and rule of law, on top of political freedom and democracy. Increased contact […] seems to feed the same sense of distinctiveness that occurred when visits to China were first allowed at the end of the 1980s (Muyard 2010: 20) .
Various polls asking whether the Taiwanese regard themselves as "Chinese" or "Taiwanese" have shown that the number of people shifting towards a "Taiwanese"-only identity is once more increasing: According to the NCCU Election Survey Center's polls, in June 2010, 52.4 per cent of the respondents identified themselves as Taiwanese, 40.4 per cent as Taiwanese and Chinese, and 3.8 per cent as Chinese (Election Study Center National Chengchi University 2010). Political rapprochement, economic integration, the growing number of tourists from the PRC to Taiwan, and the admission of PRC students to Taiwanese colleges and universities have been accompanied by an increasing trend toward Taiwanization in the cultural sphere, and also in the realm of identitynever before have so many respondents chosen to identify themselves as Taiwanese only. The belief that increasing integration under a new proChina government would translate into the rise of a common Chinese identity and a yearning for political unification among the Taiwanese has been shown to be "completely off the mark" (Muyard 2010: 19) .
Revisiting Taiwanization
Given the contradictory developments mentioned above, this would seem to be a propitious moment to re-examine the phenomena associated with "Taiwanization" which accompanied Taiwan's political liberalization in the 1990s. Most authors claim that the process of Taiwanization ( , Taiwan bentuhua) started as early as the 1970s and 1980s, when even discussing the topic was illegal. In its early stages, Taiwanization was mainly restricted to the areas of literature ( , bentu wenxue, nativist literature) and theology ( , bentu shenxue, homeland theology) because, during the martial law period, the KMT authorities believed Taiwanization would undermine state legitimacy (Huang, Liu, and Chang 2004; Wu 2004: 616-617) . The ROC's de facto control over Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen and Mazu after 1949 led to the increasing identification of the ROC with Taiwan in spite of all the measures taken to keep the myth alive that the ROC was still existing within the pre-1949 borders (Cabestan 2005) . A series of political reforms introduced by Lee Teng-hui (Li Denghui, *1923 , president of the ROC 1988 -2000 paved the way for the development of a new Taiwan consciousness. In 1997, the government introduced a new textbook for secondary schools entitled "Getting to Know Taiwan" ( , renshi Taiwan). This represented a shift away from the China-centric historiography, in which Taiwan was viewed as a peripheral part of China, to that of Taiwan as a maritime island with links to various cultures, including the former Western colonial powers and Japan (Wang 2005) . With the change of government in 2000 from the KMT to the DPP, Taiwanization reached its peak with the full support of the government, particularly during Chen Shui-bian's second term. The branding of Taiwan ( , xingxiao Taiwan) at both state and societal levels was witnessed everywhere, both inside and outside Taiwan. Chang Bi-yu summarized the cultural policy of the DPP as emphasizing "the economic value of culture industries, the theorization of Taiwanese subjectivity, and branding Taiwan as a cultural product" (Chang 2004 ). These three elements of Taiwanization focused to a great extent on Taiwan alone, and China did not play an important role. This new "homeland" was "constructed by promoting tourism in Taiwan, Taiwanese literature and the new academic discipline of 'Taiwan studies'" (Kaeding 2009: 24) . Mandarin remained the official language for general use, but "Native Language" was introduced as a compulsory subject in elementary schools. Nevertheless, the pan-blue scholars saw Taiwanization as wholesale de-Sinicization ( , qu Zhongguohua) led by the government and did not take into account the painstaking negotiations between civil society, the ruling party and the opposition party in order to carry out certain reforms aimed at bringing education and language use closer to what was regarded by the majority of the Taiwanese as reality.
Many academic works have dealt with the trend of Taiwanization up until 2008: In the English language, the edited volume by John Makeham and A-chin Hsiau, Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan: Bentuhua (Makeham and Hsiau 2005) , has provided the best overview to date. First of all, the authors examine a variety of terms used in Taiwan, including bentuhua ( , the closest translation being "indigenization" or "localization"), which is closely linked to Taiwanese consciousness ( , Taiwan yishi), Taiwanese identity ( , Taiwan rentong) and Taiwanese subjectivity ( , Taiwan zhutixing) (Makeham 2005: 1) . In the introduction, Makeham and Jacobs argue that "Taiwanization" is the most appropriate English translation for bentuhua because it connotes the spirit of the term rather than its literal meaning. They make a further distinction between this and the political meaning of Taiwanization -that is, the process which allows benshengren ( , native Taiwanese) to demand and secure full citizenship, to achieve equal political citizenship and political power, and to pursue the goal of a distinct nation-state status for Taiwan. Culturally, it refers to the general idea that the uniqueness of Taiwanese society, culture and history must be appreciated and interpreted from the viewpoint of the Taiwanese people (Makeham 2005: 11) .
In this issue of the Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, the term "Taiwanization" (in Chinese, Taiwan bentuhua) will be employed. The term bentuhua alone is more commonly used in Taiwan; Taiwanhua sounds rather like a back-translation from English. The terms "localization" and "indigenization" do not fully convey the multicultural and globalized essence of Taiwanization. This leads us to reject Jacobs' definition of Taiwanization as "a focus on Taiwan as opposed to China (or the world)" (Jacobs 2005: 19) . In order to draw attention to the hybrid and globalized nature of culture, the emphasis should not be on "opposing" cultures, but rather on the integrative features of Taiwanization. In addition to the papers contained in this journal, various other recent publications in Taiwan support this definition: Bao Chunliang, for example, identified four main trends: "integrated", "normative", "instrumental" and "state-government-controlled" Taiwanization. Bao's findings show a strong increase in the integrated trends, some increase in the normative and the instrumentalist trends, and a sharp decline in the stategovernment-controlled trends after 2008 (Bao 2009: 159) . Taking into account the election of Ma Ying-jeou in 2008, Bao also states that it was the democratization processes in Taiwan which had forced the KMT to accept the concept of bentuhua (Bao 2009: 161) . A number of authors involved in research on Taiwan's new claims of multiculturalism also concluded that Chen Shui-bian (re)defined Taiwanization as "multiculturalism" ( , duo wenhua zhuyi) to avoid the criticism from non- (Liu 2008: 101) .
In the field of education, Taiwanization is now primarily seen as shifting away from the focus on China, not through the promotion of the Hoklo culture but rather through the implementation of legal measures, such as the use of the Western calendar and "local dialects". During the eight years of Chen Shui-bian's presidency, Mandarin remained the language of education and was not replaced by Hoklo, which is spoken by the majority of people in Taiwan (Lin 2008: 39-40; Sommers 2010) . Taiwanization, for our purposes, is understood as a growing manifestation of Taiwan's postcoloniality and not as part of Taiwan's complex "decolonization" process following the lifting of martial law in 1987. While "decolonization" is very much about pursuing a new Taiwanese state (whether by declaring independence or establishing a new constitution), Taiwanization as postcoloniality is oriented toward creating and consolidating a new culture and identity that is multicultural and hybrid; this apolitical definition of Taiwanization also sidesteps the sensitive question of sovereignty. Taiwanization, as a postcolonial discourse, reconfigures centre-periphery relations with the result that Taiwan, regarded as a peripheral part of China in a China-centric historiography, attains subjectivity. This paradigm shift allows colonial (alien) cultures and local cultures, which were overlooked if not simply rejected in the China-centric historiography, to be appropriated as indispensible and important elements of Taiwan. At the same time, Taiwan's occupation of a liminal, in-between space intensifies the hybrid and multicultural nature of Taiwanization narratives (Cheng, Wang, and de Zepetnek 2009; Lee 2008) .
Overview of Individual Papers
The original versions of the papers included in this special issue were presented at the International Taiwan Studies Workshop 2010: "'Whither Taiwanization?' State, Society and Cultural Production in the New Era" at the Graduate Institute of Taiwan Studies, Chang Jung Christian Uni-versity, Tainan, Taiwan, 23-24 April 2010. The discussions focused on whether Taiwanization is being replaced by another attempt at (re-) Sinicization similar to that undertaken during the years of authoritarian rule, when the state was powerful enough to marginalize any other civic discourses. The authors of the papers in this volume have undertaken investigations of the state of Taiwanization in different areas of Taiwanese society, employing a wide range of interdisciplinary approaches that overarch political science, sociology, anthropology, history and linguistics. Their findings suggest that Taiwanization is not a social and cultural phenomenon easily swayed by a political mood and affected by government policies, but rather a much more tangible and enduring cultural creation. Each author attempts to re-access the relationship between "Taiwanization" and "Sinicization": Are the two necessarily in a zerosum relationship? Is there any sort of sphere where the two could comfortably coexist? In other words, can Sinicization and Taiwanization be seen as a thesis and an antithesis from which a synthesis could emerge?
Yoshihisa Amae (CJCU), in his paper "Pro-colonial or Postcolonial? Appropriation of Japanese Colonial Heritage in Present-day Taiwan", examines the recent trend toward preserving the Japanese heritage in Taiwan, such as the Shinto shrines, martial art halls (Butokuden), war monuments, and Japanese statues and busts. Amae explains that many colonial structures from the Japanese era were not preserved or restored in their original forms, but were deformed, or rather transformed, often with distinct Chinese or Taiwanese characteristics. This finding leads him to point out that the preservation of the Japanese heritage cannot be viewed as "pro-colonialism" or as "re-Japanization", but rather as a postcolonial endeavour. The author contends that the Japanese structures advance a Taiwan-centric historiography, in which Taiwan is imagined as hybrid and multicultural.
Lutgard Lams (University College Brussels, HUB) and Xavier L. W. Liao (Free University of Brussels), in "Tracing 'Taiwanization' Processes in Taiwanese Presidential Statements in Times of Cross-Strait Rapprochement", examine President Ma Ying-jeou's public statements from 2008 onward in search of what they call a "Taiwanized consensus" -a synthesis or a blend of Taiwanese self-identification with a Chinesecentric cultural articulation. A careful analysis of the presidential texts leads them to observe that although Ma emphasized "ethnic harmony" and called Taiwan his "homeland", he did not refer to Taiwan as a "motherland" or a "future motherland" as did his predecessors. Instead, he stressed the common Chinese origin of the people of Taiwan and mainland China. Another example of the "blend" is Ma's metaphorical reference to the "rebirth" of the ROC on Taiwan, which enables him to emphasize the mainland origin of the republic. Referring to the upcoming 100 th anniversary of the ROC, Ma said that the ROC spent a short 38 years on the Chinese mainland, but has spent nearly 60 years in Taiwan. During these last six decades, the destinies of the Republic of China and Taiwan have been intertwined (2010).
Lams and Liao point out that in Ma's discourse, the polarizing positions of Taiwan versus China have been masked or softened through ambiguous or empty signifiers. They conclude that this ambiguity has allowed Taiwanization to embrace the internal hybridity of cultures and conflicting perspectives.
Jens Damm (CJCU), in "Taiwan's Ethnicities and their Representation on the Internet", discusses the importance of a multicultural policy for Taiwanization from two different perspectives: first of all, in the context of the more recent definition of Taiwanization that emphasizes the potentially significant aspects of such a policy, and, second, within the conceptual framework of multiculturalism seen as part of a civic society project, steering the focus away from a state-organized cultural policy and instead toward the inclusion of various societal actors. The key questions dealt with in his paper are the ways in which multiculturalism and participation in cultural life are expressed in Taiwan's new media. Due consideration is also given to the question of the extent to which the state influences these developments through legislation and funding. As a basis for this research, several websites dealing with or created by ethnic minorities are analysed, and the results are then, where possible, compared with the findings and conclusions drawn from research carried out by the author over the last ten years. He concludes that there is general acceptance of a wide variety of cultures in Taiwan today, and although the Chinese influence in a broad cultural sense remains strong, a new emphasis on cultural diversity shared by a large majority of Taiwan's population has emerged.
Tanguy Lepesant (National Central University) critically questions the maintenance of boundaries between ethnic groups ( , zuqun) in Taiwan by carrying out interviews with the new generation of Taiwanese citizens, those born in the 1980s. Thus, taking into account recent sociopolitical changes, he is able to maintain a reflexive position with regard to the categories used by the social sciences. His key question is thus whether or not the different factors that contributed to the formation and the deepening of ethnic boundaries and ethnic conflict during the periods of KMT dictatorship, liberalization and democratization are still effective and significant amongst this group of Taiwanese between 20 and 30 years of age. His paper shows that at the level of the youngest generation of citizens, ethnic boundaries that appeared during the KMT dictatorship period and were reinforced during the liberalization and democratization periods are progressively vanishing. Ethnicity is no longer a central source of meaning and dignity. Ethnic identification is weakening, and "ethnic division" and "ethnic conflict" within this generation are not sources of major concern in everyday life. Nevertheless, the Taiwanese in their twenties still see their society, as a whole, as ethnically divided.
Chia-Yin Chuang's (National Taiwan Normal University) paper "Divorcing China: The Swing from the Patrilineal Genealogy of China to the Matrilineal Genealogy of Taiwan in Taiwan's National Imagination" explores the popular concept of the relationship between Taiwan and mainland China as a feminine-masculine dichotomy. She illustrates this with a detailed study of representative popular songs. She addresses two key questions: firstly, how the national imagination of Taiwan was constructed in popular songs of the 1990s through maternal and feminine images, and secondly, how a matrilineal genealogy in Taiwanese popular songs was appropriated by the opposition camp -namely, the DPP -to mobilize voters. Moreover, whereas the family trope of Chinese nationalism refers to the Yellow Emperor, again a male, as the common ancestry and the people as his children, she points out that in the family trope of Taiwanese nationalism, the body and the figure of the mother are employed to refer to the collective identification with the island nation. Taiwan, she argues, is thus portrayed as "a silent, traumatized, tender and tenacious mother without a name" facing the dominant masculine image of China. She also asserts that the Taiwanese matrilineal genealogy represents resistance to the Chinese patrilineal genealogy; in the national imagination of the Taiwanese people, China, the common father, "has been divorced".
To summarize, the papers presented here -in particular, the papers by Amae, Damm and Chuang -show that cultural Taiwanization is certainly not "dead", but that the concept and definitions of Taiwanization need to be broadened: Taiwanization should be considered in the context of a multicultural, global and hybrid society with various ethnic groups and a high degree of diversity, not in the context of Taiwan as a Hoklo-dominated society in essentialist terms. In other words, Taiwanization should be perceived as civic (inclusive) instead of ethnic (exclusive) and should, in its current form, be understood as part of a postcolonial identity-formation discourse. This new and different framework for explaining the various political and cultural phenomena of Taiwanization refers to a hybrid identity on the island of Taiwan which brings together various ethnic groups and is influenced by a history focused not only on China but also on other (colonial) regimes and particular developments after World War II. This is not to deny the fact that Sinicization has played a role, both historically and more recently, but Sinicization in Taiwan has taken place within the specific framework of Taiwanization. In other words, Sinicization in Taiwan has also been somewhat contextualized (that is, "Taiwanized") due to factors such as geographical constraints, social taste and political calculations.
The papers in this journal also show that the "state factor" has to be taken into account in any attempt to assess the extent to which Taiwanization is a state-driven project and the extent to which it is autonomous and thus independent of the state, of state initiatives and funding. It seems that the weighting of the state-driven factor has decreased and that the maturity of Taiwan's civic society has dramatically increased, with the result that the previously mentioned examples of de-Taiwanization by the new government have yet to take root within society and the cultural spheres of the island. We are suspicious of claims that regard the re-emergence of state-sponsored Sinicization as similar to that seen in the first decades of KMT rule over Taiwan. Similarly, we believe that it would be too simplistic to think that cross-Strait economic integration will lead to de-Taiwanization.
As a result of the changes that have taken place in the political climate since 2008, the question "Whither Taiwanization?" has lost none of its significance. While under the current government, Taiwanization in the form of a political attempt to build a new nation-state is virtually non-existent, the question remains as to whether Taiwanization as a broader cultural and societal phenomenon will continue and in which direction. Certainly, there is no trace, as yet, of any state-led "de-Taiwanization" movement. Occasional claims that Taiwanization has been jettisoned by the new KMT government and that Taiwan is being re-Sinicized should not be taken at face value; a cautious approach is required, for example, to the question of whether Taiwanization and Sinicization can coexist in various spheres of Taiwanese civic society. Political rapprochement in the Taiwan Strait should not be equated with a return to the authoritarian system, when the KMT government using martial law could present to the world a Taiwan that pretended to be more Chinese than China.
Outlook
What does this mean for cross-Strait relations? Taiwan, in comparison with the mainland, is small in size and population, and the political and economic power (total GDP) of the People's Republic of China far eclipses that of Taiwan. Yet this does not mean that Taiwan must succumb to Beijing's political will, and, in fact, we do not assign much credibility to such a fatalistic view of the situation. Perhaps not so much politically, but rather culturally, Taiwanization is to some extent globalizing, and its cultural productions ("Made in Taiwan" or "MIT") are being exported to areas beyond the island's shores. To sum up, Taiwanization is a cultural force that challenges traditional Chinese values; Taiwanese culture is, first of all, hybrid and firmly rejects the essentialist search for purity as suggested in the paper by Amae. Second, it is matriarchal, and therefore poses a challenge to patriarchal Chinese Confucian values, as Chuang suggests in her paper on the Taiwanese national imagination. Third, Taiwanization is principally anti-colonial, anti-hegemonic and anti-racial or, in other words, characterized by democratic and liberal values.
Through Taiwan's experience of colonization, democratization, and political independence from mainland China, Taiwanization has now developed into a political and cultural force that is indigenous, autonomous (independent from outside forces) and vibrant. Yet, as Taiwan further engages and interacts with mainland China and the rest of the world, Taiwanization is becoming global: "Global Taiwanization" or the Taiwanization of mainland China and other areas is a phenomenon which needs to be examined. Taiwan was dependent and voiceless through successive periods of colonization. Politically, Taiwan may have missed out on the opportunities for de jure independence in the 1950s and 1960s, becoming a "latecomer [that] strives for statehood at the turn of the twenty-first century" (Hsiau 2005: 272) . Yet 20 years after liberalization and democratization, the liquidity of the colonial past has now been transformed into a cultural asset which can help the island nation thrive in the globalized twenty-first century. Closer cooperation between mainland China and Taiwan could also mean that some aspects of Taiwanization, such as multiculturalism, and a shift away from being an ethnic nation towards being a civic nation, with the empowerment of the civic society, could spread to China. Increasing cooperation with mainland China can therefore present an opportunity for -rather than a threat to -Taiwan's future development. Such a climate change offers new prospects for the relationship between Taiwan and the mainland, allowing a future to be envisioned in which increasing Taiwanization, including the consolidation of a Taiwanese identity, will synchronize economic integration and political rapprochement across the Taiwan Strait.
